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THE FARMER, THE COOPERATIVE, AND THE COMMISSIONER
By GEORGE E. COUPER*
A recent report of the United States Department of Agriculture indicates
that there are 10,114 active farmer cooperatives in the United States.
Memberships in these groups total seven and one-half million. More than
130,000 of these memberships are California farmers who did a net
business of $803,256,000 with their organizations.1 That figure is almost
one-third of the value of all farm produce marketed in California.2 These
statistics indicate that almost every attorney except the most specialized
will eventually have some contact with a farmer cooperative. It is reason-
able to assume that one of his problems will involve the special rules of
Federal taxation of these organizations and their patrons.
A true agricultural cooperative is a farmer owned and controlled
business organization which markets the produce or purchases the supplies
used in agricultural production for the mutual benefit of its farmer members.
An agricultural cooperative does business on a cost basis returning to the
farmer all sums realized in excess of expenses of operation and mainte-
nance and other authorized retentions. The organization may issue capital
stock but the primary financial benefit is intended for the agricultural
producer who buys from or sells through his organization. Patronage, not
money invested in the enterprise, determines the distribution of benefits.3
Farmer cooperatives, frequently called associations or mutuals, are
generally incorporated. There are agricultural cooperative association acts
in all forty-eight states4 and the National Conference of commissioners
on Uniform State Laws adopted a uniform agricultural cooperative corpo-
ration act.5 In addition, the courts have recognized enterprises organized
under general business corporation laws as cooperatives.6
If a farmer sells his produce to or through his cooperative, the market-
ing organization is required to seek the best price available for him. It
returns to the farmer all it receives less expenses and retentions. The
member purchasing farm supplies and machinery from his association pays
*A.B., University of California, 1947; LL.B., Hastings College of Law, 1953. Assistant Counsel,
California Farm Bureau Federation.1 U. S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, STATISTICS OF FARMER COOPERATIVES 52 (1955).
'CALIFORNIA DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, BULL. No. 3 (1954).
'"The individual farmer is ordinarily both an investor in, and a patron of, the cooperative
association of which he is a member. His contribution to the success of the venture is, therefore,
a two-fold one, involving both his capital and his patronage. As an investor in the association,
he is promised a limited return on his equity in the association. As a patron he is promised his
proportionate share in the savings made possible by his contribution to the pooling of purchases
or sales and in any income which the association may derive from its activities." Hearings Before
the House Ways and Means Committee, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., at 3135 (1947).
'A. L. JENSEN AND OTHERS, COOPERATIVE CORPORATE ASSOCIATION LAw 11 (1950).
'PROCEEDINGS OF NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS 180 (1936).
' Peoples Gin Company, Inc., 118 F.2d 72 (5th Cir. 1941); Grey Bull Corporation, 27 B.T.A.
853 (1933) ; and Moe v. Earle, 5 CCH 1955 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 1f 9180 (D. Ore. 1954).
(143)
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cost plus estimated expenses of the organization. Both types of cooperatives
are obligated to return to their members at the end of the fiscal period their
pro rata share of the surplus based on the amount of their patronage. This
rule was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in an
opinion which read in part:
"In order to be a true cooperative, however, the decisions emphasize
that there must be a legal obligation on the part of the association, made
before the receipt of income, to return to the members on a patronage
basis all funds received in excess of the cost of goods sold. Such an obligation
may arise from the association's articles of incorporation, its by-laws or
some other contract."
7
With one exception the mere fact that an enterprise is organized as a
cooperative is not sufficient to create the obligation to return patronage
dividends.' The obligation of a California agricultural association to return
surplus to members based on their patronage was held to arise from the
law under which it was organized.9 Several writers have criticized the
decision;'0 and it would appear that a more concrete contract to return
surplus to patrons is required for Federal Income Tax purposes.
In addition to the articles of incorporation and by-laws mentioned by
the court in the American Shook Box Export case above, agreements to pay
patronage dividends are commonly found in the marketing contracts which
most cooperatives execute with their producer members.
Voting control, in most associations, is vested in farmers who produce
or consume the commodity handled. Members may have one vote only,
or may vote in proportion to their patronage in the prior year. In any
event, capital stock ownership is not the criterion for voting control in
cooperatives. On dissolution, net assets are distributed to patrons on the
basis of their patronage."
From this general description of cooperatives, it is easy to predict
that they would have peculiar tax problems not faced by .he ordinary
incorporated enterprise.
I. The Cooperative and the Commissioner
The pro rata share of cooperative profits which is allocated to the
farmer at the end of the fiscal period is called a patronage dividend. This
"American Shook Box Export Assn. v. Commissioner, 156 F.2d 629, 630 (9th Cir. 1946). See
also United Cooperatives, 4 T.C. 93 (1944).
' Farmers Union State Exchange, 30 B.T.A. 1051 (1943) ; Fountain City Cooperative Creamery
Assn. v. Commissioner, 172 F.2d 666 (7th Cir. 1949).
' American Shook Box Export Assn. v. Commissioner, 156 F.2d 629, 631 (9th Cir. 1946), refer-
ring to San Joaquin Valley Poultry Producers Assn. v. Commissioner, 136 F.2d 382 (9th Cir. 1943).
See AGRICULTURAL CODE OF CALIFORNIA, §§ 1190-1221.
'0 JENSEN AND OTHERS, op. cit. supra note 4, at 88; DAVIS, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE
TAX STATUS OF FARMER COOPERATIVES 54 (1950) ; HENSEL, DIGEST OF SELECTED CASES AND RULINGS
ON FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF FARMER COOPERATIVES 92 (1950).
" Davis, op. cit. supra note 10.
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return may take many forms but in any form it represents the farmer's
share of the profits based on the business he has done with his association.
Patronage dividends or patronage refunds as they are sometimes called
will be more fully explained later, but for present purposes it is sufficient
to know that they may be cash dividends or they may be in documentary
form evidencing a debt of the cooperative or indicating the patron's share
of some capital item or fund.
In 1914 the Treasury Department ruled that a patronage dividend
was in effect a refund of a part of the association's gross income and as
such, for purposes of tax accounting, it could be treated as a reduction of
gross income.12 This ruling has been criticized by the United States Ninth
Circuit Court on at least two occasions as overly liberal." Despite the
criticism, the Internal Revenue Service has not changed its position materially
since the initial finding. The Commissioner once insisted that patronage
dividends gave rise to an exclusion from gross income not a deduction. 4
Apparently the reasoning behind the continued favored treatment was that
the pre-existing obligation to pay patronage dividends took those sums out
of the constitutional definition of income. 5 However, the terms deduction
and exclusion are used interchangeably in the cases in this field of law. The
courts seem to prefer to call this accounting peculiarity a deduction. Congress
refers to a deduction in considering this problem 6 and recent Revenue
Rulings have acceded to this usage. 7 It has been pointed out that regardless
of the term used, the result is the same."
While the Treasury Department has consistently granted the coopera-
tive the right to exclude patronage dividends, extensive fringe litigation
has occurred over the deduction. The Commissioner has questioned whether
there was a pre-existing obligation to pay patronage dividends;"9 whether
22 T. D. 1996, 1914.
8 "The Congress has not legislated the deduction, and the courts cannot usurp that function.
Whether the respondent should have allowed the deduction he did allow is a question upon which
we express no opinion.
"We know of no manner in which such liberality may be reviewed by the court." Cooperative
Oil Assn. v. Commissioner, 115 F.2d 666, 668, 669 (9th Cir. 1940). See also Riverdale Cooperative
Creamery v. Commissioner, 48 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1931).
141L T. 3208, 1938-2 CuM. BULL. 127.
'"Exclusion of patronage dividends from taxable income is not limited to cooperatives. In
the case of both cooperatives and ordinary corporations, patronage dividends or price rebates are
excludable if paid in accordance with a contractual obligation in effect at the time of the trans-
action.... To the extent, however, that patronage dividends represent non-income businesses
or evidences of capital contributions of patrons-their exclusion from taxable income of the
cooperatives confers no special tax advantage." Hearings Before the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., at 3142 (1947). But see Farmers Union Co-op. of Guide Rock v.
Commissioner, 90 F.2d 488 (8th Cir. 1937) where that theory was disapproved.
'8 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 522.
"Rev. Rul. 55-141, 1955 INT. REV. BuLL. No. 11, at 21.
'8 HENSEL, op. cit. supra note 10, at 4.
"Anamosa Farmer's Creamery Co., 13 B.T.A. 907 (1928).
nonmember patrons received equal treatment;"0 and whether patronage
dividends were actually allocated to patrons.2"
A limited exemption was provided in the 1916 Revenue Act for asso-
ciations acting as sales agent for members and turning back proceeds less
expenses on the basis of quantity of produce delivered.22 This exemption was
extended in the Revenue Act of 1921 to include organizations which pur-
chased supplies as agents for the producer.23 In 1926 the Revenue Act
contained the first comprehensive tax exemption for farmers' cooperatives.
The report of the Senate Finance Committee of that year indicates that
the exemption granted merely confirmed part of the fundamental policy
of the Treasury Department toward these organizations.2 t
The 1926 Revenue Act contained the following language:
The following organizations shall be exempt from taxation under this
chapter . .. (12) Farmers', fruit growers', or like associations organized
and operated on a cooperative basis (a) for the purpose of marketing the
products of members or other producers, and turning back to them the
proceeds of sales, less the necessary marketing expenses, on the basis of
either the quantity or the value of the products furnished by them, or (b) for
the purpose of purchasing supplies and equipment for the use of members
or other persons, and turning over such supplies and equipment to them at
actual cost, plus necessary expenses. Exemption shall not be denied any
such association because it has capital stock, if the dividend rate of such
stock is fixed at not to exceed the legal rate of interest in the State of
incorporation or 8 per centum per annum, whichever is greater, on the
value of the consideration for which the stock was issued and if substantially
all such stock (other than nonvoting preferred stock, the owners of which
are not entitled or permitted to participate, directly or indirectly, in the profits
of the association, upon dissolution or otherwise, beyond the fixed dividends)
is owned by producers who market their products or purchase their supplies
and equipment through the association; nor shall exemption be denied any
such association because there is accumulated and maintained by it a reserve
required by State law or a reasonable reserve for any necessary purpose.
Such an association may market the products of nonmembers in an amount
the value of which does not exceed the value of the products marketed for
members, and may purchase supplies and equipment for nonmembers in an
amount the value of which does not exceed the value of the supplies and
equipment purchased for members, provided the value of the purchases made
20 Farmers Union Co-op of Guide Rock v. Commissioner, 90 F.2d 488 (8th Cir. 1937).
" Milk Producers Association of Calif., P-H 1949 T.C. Mem. Dec. 1144,227.
2 39 STAT. 766, § 11.
2 42 STAT. 253, § 231.
2" "The committee amendment does not broaden the scope of nor even include all the provisions
of the Treasury regulations but only incorporates certain provisions adopted by the Department
as fundamental in allowing exemptions to cooperative marketing and purchasing associations. The
amendment will assure associations, now exempt, that the liberal construction, by the Department,
of existing law is sanctioned by Congress and if enacted will prevent a valid, but perhaps sudden
or drastic, restriction upon exemptions, such as is now possible under existing law." S. REaP. 69th
Cong., 2nd Sess. 13 (1926).
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for persons who are neither members nor producers does not exceed 15
per centum of the value of all its purchases.
25
In 1936 Congress added:
"Business done for the United States or any of its agencies shall be dis-
regarded in determining the right to exemption under this paragraph.
2 6
The language of the 1926 cooperative exemption with the noted addition
has appeared in every subsequent revenue act and even survived the
changes in the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, although broken down into
numbered paragraphs."
The quoted section of the 1926 Revenue Act prescribed eight rules for
determining whether an association was entitled to exemption. These condi-
tions were:
1. The association must be formed by producers.
2. It must be obligated to operate on a nonprofit basis.
3. The cooperative must purchase supplies or sell produce.
4. Substantially all capital stock (if any) must be in the hands of farmers
except nonvoting nonparticipating preferred stock, dividends on which do not
exceed 8 per cent or the legal rate in the State of incorporation.
5. Reserves must be reasonable and necessary or required by state law.
6. All patrons must be treated alike whether members or not.
7. Nonmember business cannot exceed member business.
8. Nonmember nonfarmer business cannot exceed 15 per cent in purchasing
cooperatives.
Failure to meet the test of any one of the eight conditions precluded
exemption. However, the nonexempt cooperative was still allowed to deduct
amounts properly paid as patronage dividends as a result of the rulings
already mentioned. In order to be deductible the profit participation had to
be by all patrons, whether members or not, as a result of a pre-existing
obligation on the association to pay. If the cooperative did nonmember
business but only members shared in profits, the amount attributable to
nonmember business was not allowed as a deduction.
The formula for computing net taxable income of a cooperative was
set forth in Ruling 6967.2" After taking apparent net income, amounts paid
as true patronage dividends could be further excluded before computing
the amount of profit subject to tax. Though sounding simple, the computation
is quite complicated where preferred stock dividends are paid and that fact
was pointed out by the Board of Tax Appeals in a case in which the Commis-
sioner had erred in favor of the association.29
Dividends paid on capital stock and Federal Income Tax are generally
"44 STAT. 39, § 231(12) (1926).
"48 STAT. 700 (1936).
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 521.
111-1 Cu . BuLL. 287 (1924).
"Farmers Union Cooperative Exchange, 42 B.T.A. 1200 (1940).
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paid out of profits and would not figure in apparent net income. Yet the
amount available for patronage dividends cannot be computed until these
two items are known. As long as a nonexempt cooperative pays preferred
stock dividends it will also be liable for Federal income taxes since it cannot
distribute all income in patronage dividends. In addition, since the amount
of the tax is not an amount paid in patronage dividends, the nonexempt
cooperative cannot deduct the amount of the tax from apparent net income
and therefore pays a tax on the amount of the tax. A simultaneous equation
is required to compute the actual tax liability and the amount available to
patrons as patronage dividends.
The special advantage given to associations in the Revenue Act of 1926
and subsequent years came under a great deal of fire. They were competing
with retail enterprises, produce houses, processors and buyers. The coop-
erative gave the farmer big buying power and stabilized the price he received
for his crops or livestock. He generally received better prices when he sold
through his organization and this necessarily increased the cost of goods to
the retailer.
The cooperatives were not entirely blameless. Many took advantage of
the benevolent tax laws to create huge reserves and distribute profits improp-
erly. Activities of the associations were investigated by the Committee on
Small Business of the House of Representatives" and their favored tax
status discussed by the American Bar Association's Section on Corporation,
Banking and Mercantile Law."'
These inquiries culminated in 1951 in changes to the Revenue Code
which had far reaching effects on some cooperatives. In that year, Congress
amended section 101(12) to provide that cooperatives exempt under that
section would be subject to corporate normal and surtaxes. In one breath
they said the associations were tax exempt and in the next they made the
associations subject to taxes. When the term tax exempt is applied to coopera-
tives it must be considered in a qualified sense. Despite the withdrawal of
fully exempt status, cooperatives still enjoyed a favored position. The
amendments granted them special deductions not allowed the ordinary
corporation. 2 In addition to the long recognized exclusion of patronage
30 H. R. REP. No. 1888, Competition of Cooperatives with Other Forms of Business Enterprise,
79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946).
"1 PROCEEDINGS, 181-185, 1946.
82 (B) An organization exempt from taxation under the provisions of subparagraph (A) shall
be subject to the taxes imposed by sections 13 and 15, or section 117(c) (1) except that in
computing the net income of such an organization there shall be allowed as deductions from gross
income (in addition to other deductions allowable under section 23)-
(i) amounts paid as dividends during the taxable year upon its capital stock, and
(ii) amounts allocated during the taxable year to patrons with respect to its income
not derived from patronage (whether or not such income was derived during such taxable
year) whether paid in cash, merchandise, capital stock, revolving fund certificates, retain
certificates, certificates of indebtedness, letters of advice, or in some other manner that
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dividends, exempt associations were allowed to deduct from taxable income
amounts paid as capital stock dividends33 and amounts distributed on a
patronage basis derived from nonpatronage income."
An exempt co-op which paid out all of its net income in stock dividends
or patronage dividends was in no worse position than it had been prior to
the amendment. But the organization which accumulated surplus other than
reasonable and necessary business reserves found itself facing a tax burden.
This liability, however, was not as staggering as that of the unfavored
corporation which had to consider in addition the excess profits tax and the
tax on accumulated earnings.
The accumulation of unreasonable reserves was one of the charges most
often levelled at cooperatives during the congressional hearings3" and it is
likely that Congress intended these changes to be fair warning to all farmers'
cooperatives to mend their ways or face further stringent legislation. The
1951 revision places the exempt and nonexempt association in a more
analogous situation. The exempt organization now is forced to allocate all
income to patrons or preferred shareholders to avoid taxation. The non-
exempt co-op may avoid taxation on its patronage income by allocating it
to patrons. The basic distinction between the two is that the exempt associa-
tion may deduct from gross income stock dividends and amounts allocated
to patrons not derived from patronage. The nonexempt co-op which incurs
nonpatronage income must pay taxes on this profit. Payment of stock divi-
dends out of income will also subject the nonexempt association to taxes as
pointed out earlier in this article.
It is interesting to note that the 1951 legislation contained the first
legislative recognition of the Treasury Department's long standing practice
of allowing nonexempt cooperatives to deduct patronage dividends from
gross income. 6 The same language appears in the 1954 code."T
Despite the obvious advantages of securing exemption, many coopera-
tives prefer to remain nonexempt. In the case of an association which pays
no capital stock dividends and distributes all income to patrons there
is no tax advantage to exemption unless the organization realizes non-
discloses to each patron the dollar amount allocated to him. Allocations made after the
close of the taxable year and on or before the fifteenth day of the ninth month following
the close of such year shall be considered as made on the last day of such taxable year to
the extent the allocations are attributable to income derived before the close of such year.
INT. R V. CODE OF 1939, 101 (12).
"'Id. § (i).
I'Id. § (ii). Such income can arise from sales by a purchasing co-op to the United States,
by a capital gain, interest income on loans made by the association, etc.
a H. R. REP. No. 1888, 79th Cong, 2d Sess. (1946).
8 8Patronage Dividends ... shall be taken into account in computing taxable income in the
same manner as in the case of a cooperative organization not exempt under this section. INT. REV.
CODE OF 1939, § 101(12).
" INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 522.
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patronage income. Other cooperatives prefer to restrict the distribution of
patronage dividends to members though they may do nonmember business
-a practice which. prevents qualifying for exemption. 8
The exempt cooperative makes an annual return on form 990-C. The
Tax Court ruled in Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner,39 that
the filing of "Forms 990" by a nonprofit organization did not start the
Statute of Limitations running against assessment of delinquent taxes because
these forms did not require the taxpayer to furnish sufficient information to
make a determination of tax liability. While form 990-C requires more
detailed information than required by the form filed by the Auto Club,
the cited case has created grave doubts in the minds of the users of all
exempt organization returns. In a field of law which is so unsettled, the
protection of the Statute is a very practical consideration.
At least one major cooperative found that it paid to give up its exempt
status and pay taxes because it did not have to keep detailed records on
nonmember business. Secondly, by surrendering its exemption, the association
was free to create permanent reserves out of surplus for later capital
expansion."
II. The Farmer and the Commissioner
The term patronage dividend has been used in a general sense and not
fully defined in this article. Dividends are generally thought of as payments
of money, or occasionally of goods, capital items or capital stock. Patron-
age dividends may be paid in money, but as often as not they will take
the form of retain certificates or similar documents.4 These hybrid securities
are also called advice letters, revolving fund certificates or indebtedness
certificates. Strictly speaking, they are not bonds or notes, nor do they come
within the definition of true capital stock certificates.42 Some retain certifi-
cates bear interest and others do not. Often ownership is restricted to members
or patrons of the association, but some certificates circulate freely with
other commercial paper. These documents may bear a maturity date or
not depending on the needs of the individual association.
DAVIS, op. cit. supra, note 10, at 49.
'9 20 T.C. 1033 (1953). See also John Danz, 18 T.C. 454 (1953).
,0 JENS EN AND OTHERS, op. cit. supra, note 4, at 582, speaking of a large New York co-op known
cryptically as G.L.F.
" This variance in method of making patronage refunds is recognized by Congress. INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954, § 522(b) (2) provides:
Patronage dividends, refunds, and rebates to patrons with respect to their patronage
in the same or preceding years (whether paid in cash, merchandise, capital stock, revolv-
ing fund certificates, retain certificates, certificates of indebtedness, letters of advice, or
in some other manner that discloses to each patron the dollar amount of such dividend,
refund or rebate) shall be taken into account in computing taxable income. ...
42 By whatever name known, certificates evidencing patronage dividends are not regulated under
California Corporate Securities Act. See AGRICULTURAL CODE OF CALIFORNIA, § 1220.
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By whatever title they are called, the retain certificates advise the
patron that his share of the income of the cooperative for the year based on
the amount of his patronage is a certain amount and that that sum has been
allocated to his credit on the books of the corporation. Generally these
certificates or letters are serially numbered by years. The sums retained are
debited to revolving funds which bear the designation of the year of opera-
tions in which earned. In the case of a marketing cooperative handling
different classes of produce, the fund may be broken down into sub-funds
indicating the pool to which they are applicable.43
The cooperative may apply the patronage dividend toward the purchase
of its capital stock and thus retain the profits on a permanent basis. The
reason for the cooperative retaining income and issuing certificates or
exchanging patronage dividends for capital stock in lieu of cash is obvious.
Like all businesses it constantly needs operating capital. Unlike the usual
corporation, there are unfavorable tax consequences in retaining even a
small amount of unallocated surplus. Therefore the cooperative sets up a
fund shared in by patrons from which it can draw operating capital. Assuming
all the other conditions mentioned earlier, if the cooperative allocates the
share of each patron to him on its books within eight and one-half months of
the end of its fiscal year, it may include that sum in its patronage dividend
deduction.44
In part I of this article the treatment of patronage dividends by the
paying cooperative has been considered. There is another side to this story
which must be considered. The Treasury Department has taken the position
for some time that the recipient of a patronage dividend must include it in
his gross income. If the dividend is paid in cash, the full amount is report-
able. If the dividend is in kind, such as merchandise, then the patron must
report its fair market value. If the patronage dividend consists of capital
stock or retain certificates, the face amount must be included in gross
income.45
The reasoning behind the Treasury's position is that if patronage
dividends are paid by a marketing cooperative, they constitute additional
compensation for produce sold. If the refund is from a purchasing associa-
tion, it is held to be a reduction of operating costs. The farmer may reduce
his expenses by the amount of the dividend from a purchasing co-op rather
than report an additional sum in his gross income. When the patronage
dividend takes the form of capital stock, retain certificates or merchandise,
" DAWvs, op. cit. supra, note 10, at 41-47, contains an excellent discussion of this field of
cooperative accounting.
"I INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 522(b) (2).
"Letter from T. C. Mooney, Deputy Commissioner of Internal Revenue, to National Council
of Farmer Cooperatives, November 23, 1943.
the recipient must add to his gross income or reduce expenses because of
the fiction of constructive receipt of cash.46
In 1948 the Bureau of Internal Revenue began a vigorous campaign of
enforcement directed toward the distributee of patronage dividends. For the
first time Form Number 1040F, the individual income tax return used by
farmers, contained a space specifically for inclusion of patronage dividends.
The instructions pointed out that refunds from a purchasing co-op for which
the farmer had taken no expense deduction did not constitute income. That
instruction is consistent with the theory that the patronage dividend arising
from deductible purchases is a reduction of operating costs.
The first decisive opinion arising under the "new look" in the treatment
of recipients of patronage refund certificates was Caswell v. Commissioner.4"
Petitioners were members of the Turlock Cooperative Growers Association
through which they marketed their peaches. Their produce was pooled
with other peaches of the same kind and quality. Expense records were main-
tained for each pool and after settlement of bills growers were paid their
pro rata share of the profits of the pool less an authorized retain. Retains
were credited to a capital account and members received retain certificates
which they were free to sell.
Petitioners had not included the 1945 retain certificates in their gross
income for the year and deficiencies were assessed. Petitioners had two argu-
ments. In the first place, they reasoned, they hadn't received or been entitled
to receive payment for the certificates during the year. They were on the
cash basis and therefore they did not receive income constructively or
otherwise. In any event, they maintained, the certificates had no fair market
value when issued and accordingly they realized no income under section
111 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939."s
The court admitted that some earlier decisions involving cooperatives
had rested on the theory of constructive receipt by the member of retained
surplus. The court dismissed the first of petitioner's arguments saying:
"In the instant cases the respondent [Commissioner] does not rely on
the conduit theory nor any other variation of the theory of constructive receipt
but has determined and contends that the Caswells in payment for their
peaches, and in addition to the cash distributed received other property,
namely, the certificates, and under section 111(b) supra, received and
realized income to the extent of the fair market value of the certificates at




47 17 T.C. 1190 (1952).
I-§ 111(b) Amount Realized-The amount realized from the sale or other disposition of prop-
erty shall be the sum of any money received plus the fair market value of the property (other than
money) received.
41117 T.C. at 1198.
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Petitioner's second argument received more attention. The court refused
to make an analogy between the retain certificates and more commonly known
commercial documents. Judge Murdock pointed out that the certificates could
be sold and in some instances were sold, the only restriction being that
transfers be listed on Turlock's records. He mentioned that they bore interest
at 6%, and that Turlock had redeemed certificates for other years without
undue delay. Turlock Growers' sound condition, good reputation and the
values reflected in its books were also considered. The testimony of two
Turlock bankers that the certificates were not marketable, that their purchase
was speculative and that they were not accepted as primary collateral was
not given much weight. The court concluded by saying:
"In such circumstances we think it clear that the certificates from the
date of their issuance not only had fair market value but the record gives
no leeway for saying that such fair market value was less than face." 50
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the
Tax Court.51 They considered certain provisions of Turlock Growers' mar-
keting contracts which were not considered by the Tax Court and which
provided:
"From this Association charge, organization and other general Associa-
tion expenses shall be deducted, and with the balance a commercial reserve
shall be created. Whenever any commercial reserve is no longer needed for
Association purposes, the Association shall distribute it among the Growers in
the proportions to which they are entitled. ... 52
The court also referred to the cooperative's by-laws which required
distribution of the commercial reserves to members upon dissolution.
The court held that the certificates received by appellant were mere
evidences of their contingent rights in the commercial reserve. The certifi-
cates did not give Caswells any new right or any greater right than they
had before the certificates were issued."3 Under the contract and the by-laws
the reserves were distributable only upon the happening of certain contingen-
cies which were either that there was no further need for the funds or that
the cooperative was dissolved. Neither of these contingencies occurred during
the taxable year. The certificates were not sold during that time and nothing
was received on account of them. Therefore, the court held, the certificates did
not constitute income in the year received.
Hard on the heels of the Caswell case in the Tax Court were two other
cases involving retain certificates. The first of these was Phillips v. Commis-
sioner." The Phillips Cooperative was a nonexempt association. It received
10 Id. at 1199.
51 Caswell v. Commissioner, 211 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1954).
5' Id. at 695.
B' Citing Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
#' 17 T.C. 1027 (1952).
income from marketing members' fruit and for caretaker services it per-
formed in members' groves. The marketing contracts were separate from
the caretaking agreements and only the latter contained a clause requiring
that overages be prorated back to members in revolving fund certificates if
cash were not paid. The marketing contracts were silent on the question
of patronage refunds, and there was no provision for them in the articles
of incorporation or the by-laws.
In 1946 the co-op realized profits on both its marketing and caretaking
activities. In prior years it had distributed cash refunds but that year
decided to place the funds in reserve. In place of cash, Phillips Cooperative
issued to its members revolving fund certificates which were nonassignable,
nonnegotiable and bore no interest. These documents were payable only at
the discretion of the Board of Directors. Respondents were members of the
cooperative who did not include these revolving fund certificates in their
gross income and the Commissioner assessed deficiencies.
The Tax Court decision by Judge Murdock distinguished between the
profits from marketing and caretaking. As to the former, the court pointed
out that there was no obligation on the part of the association to make a
refund. That surplus was its taxable income. The court said:
"Those certificates had no fair market value and did not represent
income to the recipients on that basis. The Cooperative never made the funds
themselves subject to the demand of any member so that constructive receipt
might apply."55
The decision went on to point out that if the certificates representing
reserved marketing profits were redeemed in later years, the amount
realized would be includable in gross income in the year received. The
Commissioner's contention that these sums were includable in 1946 gross
income was rejected.
The situation with respect to the amounts retained by the cooperative
from its 1946 caretaking activities was different, according to the court.
The association was obligated to issue revolving fund certificates. The
amounts retained by the caretaker organization did not belong to it because,
the court said, these sums had always belonged to the members who paid
for the services. Logically, if the retained sums had belonged to members
continuously they could not be profits. However, the Commissioner's assess-
ment was sustained. The members were assumed to have deducted the amount
paid for caretaker services in 1946. The court held that they should have
decreased this deduction by the amount of the applicable retain certificate,
and it assumed they had not done so.
The court's holding was consistent with a prior decision56 in which
5 Id. at 1029.
Phillips Cooperative, 17 T.C. 1002 (1952).
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Phillips Cooperative was allowed to deduct the income from caretaking for
which it issued certificates, but was denied a deduction for its marketing
income allocation.
Shortly after the Phillips case was decided, the Tax Court announced
its decision in Joplin v. Commissioner.5" Taxpayers were members of a tax
exempt cooperative and reported their income on the cash basis. For the
year in question, the cooperative allocated part of its net income to members
in the form of credits to a capital reserve account, and in addition issued
its preferred stock having a par value of $25.00 a share. Members were
not advised of their credits to the capital reserve.
Taxpayers reported neither the credits nor the preferred stock in their
gross income for the year. They contended that the income of a tax exempt
cooperative was cooperative income and a cash basis taxpayer realized no
income from capital reserve credits or a preferred stock distribution until
cash was received. They argued as an alternative that if the preferred stock
represented income when received it was only income to its fair market
value. They offered proof that the fair market value was half of the face
value.
The court disposed of the preferred stock question by citing its earlier
decision in the Caswell case to the effect that the stock was income in the
amount of its fair market value. The taxpayers' evidence of the fair
market value of the preferred shares was rejected, and the court held the
fair market value to be face value. Regarding the capital reserve credits of
which taxpayers were not advised, the court said they could only constitute
income to members on the theory of constructive receipt.
"Since the cooperative had a right under its charter and its by-laws,
and under the provisions of section 101(12) of the Code, to retain a portion
of the net earnings for operating capital reserve, such retained reserves
were its income, although exempt from tax, and not income to the patrons
until actually distributed or made available to them.
"We do not think that the taxable or nontaxable status of the cooperative
determines the tax liability of the patrons on such nondistributable profits. In
no case should the constructive receipt theory apply, we think, unless at some
time the earnings of the cooperative were made available to or were subject
to the control of the patron.
"Therefore, with respect to the amounts credited to capital reserve we
hold that the taxpayers received no taxable income."58
The opinion does not mention whether the co-op's articles of incorpo-
ration or by-laws required ultimate distribution of capital reserve credits
to members. Outwardly, however, the reserve credits here involved appear
to differ little from the usual cooperative retain except that the members
57 17 T.C. 1526 (1952).
8 Id. at 1531, 1532. See also Farmers Grain Dealers Association of Iowa v. U. S., 116 F. Supp.
685 (S.D. Iowa 1953), where the same decision was reached on similar facts.
were not advised of the allocation. Apparently the failure of the association
to notify taxpayers was the determining factor in the Joplin decision.59
To the extent the determination that the preferred stock certificates were
includible in taxpayers gross income at face value rested on the Caswell
case, the Joplin decision is open to question since the Tax Court was reversed
in the Caswell case as noted earlier.6 °
The facts in Carpenter v. Commissioner61 differ materially from those
in the prior cases. The taxpayer was a member of a tax exempt cooperative
which distributed its net income in retain certificates and by purchase of the
stock of a packing company. The shares of packing company stock were
purchased in the names of individual members of the cooperative but the
members were not advised of this fact until the following year when the
shares were issued to them. Carpenter reported his income on the cash
receipts basis and included the packing company stock in his gross income
in the year in which he received the certificate. He did not include the retain
certificates in gross income that year, but did report receipt of cash in
partial redemption of the certificate in later years.
The Revenue Service took the position that the retain certificates were
income when issued and the stock was income in the year purchased. The
Commissioner argued that the retain certificates were to be included in gross
income at face value regardless of whether or not they had any fair market
value at all when issued. In addition he claimed that since the cooperative
was allowed to deduct the amount of net income allocated in certificates,
consistency required that the amount of each allocation should be taxable
to the recipient. This argument he based on a theory of constructive receipt
and reinvestment since each member had assented to the by-laws which
required the issuance of retain certificates.
In its findings of fact the Tax Court noted that the retain certificates
were redeemable in the sole discretion of the association's Board of Directors.
The court found that they bore no interest, were transferable only on the
books of the co-op after permission of the Board, were junior to all other debts
and earlier certificates, and that the taxpayer had been unable to sell or
borrow on his certificates. Evidence was also received that there had never
been a transfer of certificates on the association's books. Finally the court
found that the certificates had no fair market value when issued.
Judge Tietjens, speaking for the court, acknowledged that the consist-
ency sought by the Commissioner might have virtue but went on to say
that the co-op and its patrons were different entities and that it did not
"But see B. A. Carpenter, 29 T.C. 603 (1953), where the failure to notify taxpayer of the
allocation was held immaterial.
30 Caswell v. Commissioner, 211 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1954).
0120 T.C. 603 (1953).
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necessarily follow that what was excludable by the cooperative was automati-
cally taxable to the patron.
Since the court had already found that the certificates had no fair
market value, the judge ruled that they were not income when issued. To
the Revenue Service's contention for the constructive receipt theory the
court answered that there was no better case for it here than in the Phillips
case. The taxpayer had no dominion over the funds and the decision to retain
them lay with the association's directors.
Turning to the question of the proper year for reporting the packing
company stock, the court ruled that the taxpayer's knowledge of the purchase
in his name was immaterial. The association was his agent for the purchase
and his rights accrued as of the date of purchase. The court then ruled
that the taxpayer had not shown the Commissioner's determination to be
incorrect, and held that the stock constituted income to Carpenter in the year
purchased for him and not the later year when he was advised of the
purchase.
The government appealed that part of the ruling concerning the fair
market value of the retain certificates. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
Tax Court in a brief decision that gave weight to the lower court's decision
but added nothing new to the field of tax law. 2
The Tax Court reached a similar decision in Howey v. Commissioner."3
They rested their ruling in favor of the taxpayer on their finding that the
retain certificates had no fair market value. The court made only casual
reference to the fact that the cooperative was not obligated to issue retain
certificates. Under Phillips v. Commissioner any prorated surplus would
have been taxable to the association since it had no pre-existing obligation
to issue the certificates and the amounts shown on these documents would
not be includable in the member's income.
Following the Fifth Circuit's decision in the Carpenter case a summary
of the positions of the agencies concerned revealed traces of distinguishable
patterns. The Commissioner had adhered to his ruling that retain certificates
were reportable in the gross income of the recipient in the year received at
their face value without regard to the basis on which the recipient reported
his income. 4 However, the fiction of constructive receipt and reinvestment,
argued by the Commissioner in the Phillips and Joplin cases, had been
sidelined in favor of the theory that retain certificates constituted other
property received in payment for produce sold. 5 He continued to rule that
if allocation of a pro rata share of a cooperative's overage to a patron
' Commissioner v. Carpenter, 219 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1955).
63 13 T.C.M. 399 (1954).
" U. S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.22 (a) -23 (1954).
' Wallace Caswell, 17 T.C. 1190, 1198 (1952), citing INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 111 (b). See
also Rev. Rul. 54-10, 1954-1 Cum. BuLL. 24.
was an obligation created by contract or by-laws, then retain certificates
representing these allocations were reportable in the year received whether
the patron was notified or not.6"
The Tax Court accepted, in the Caswell and Joplin cases, the Bureau's
contention that the taxpayer's basis for reporting was immaterial. They had,
however, rejected the government's ruling that retain certificates were
reportable at full face value. The court said that these documents were
reportable at fair market value." That determination was consistent with
the reasoning that retain certificates constituted "other property" received
under section 111(b) of the 1939 Code. Had the court followed the
constructive receipt and reinvestment theory they would logically have
been bound to rule that full face value was reportable.
The Tax Court in the earlier cases paid scant attention to evidence as
to fair market value, ruling that the market value and face value were the
same.6 Later decisions from this court indicated they would look into the
question of a fair market value different from face. 9
The theory of constructive receipt had been firmly rejected by the
Tax Court throughout the line of cases concerning taxation of retain certifi-
cates."0 In the Phillips case the court had apparently adopted the commis-
sioner's view, commonly referred to as the rule of consistency, that if the
allocated patronage dividends were rightfully excluded from the coopera-
tive's gross income they were necessarily includable in the income of the
recipient of the retain certificate representing the allocation. But in the
Carpenter case the court specifically rejected the consistency theory pointing
out that the patron and the cooperative were two different tax reporting
entities.
The Courts of Appeal had neither accepted nor rejected the commis-
sioner's determination that the taxability of retain certificates did not depend
upon the recipient's reporting on the accrual basis. The Carpenter decision
was predicated on a lack of fair market value and the Caswell case on the
fact that the allocation by the co-op was subject to contingencies. Neither
court considered the method of reporting.7 Cases in other fields of tax law
had held that cash basis taxpayers must include certain items in income which
had not been reduced to possession. 2 But the fiction of constructive receipt
was involved. As seen above, constructive receipt was rejected by the Fifth
and Ninth Circuits in cases involving retain certificates.
" B. A. Carpenter, 20 T.C. 603 (1952).
" Ibid; and Wallace Caswell, 17 T.C. 1190 (1952).
8 Wallace Caswell, supra note 67; William A. Joplin Jr., 17 T.C. 1526 (1952).
B. A. Carpenter, 20 T.C. 603 (1952) ; Mary G. Howey, 13 T.C.M. 399 (1954).
7 0 B. A. Carpenter, supra note 69; D. Phillips, 17 T.C. 1027 (1952).
'1 Commissioner v. Carpenter, 219 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1955) ; and Caswell v. Commissioner,
211 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1954).
"2 Burns v. Commissioner, 31 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1929).
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Receipt of income by a cash basis taxpayer was mentioned in the
Carpenter case by the Fifth Circuit but its brief decision relied on a deter-
mination that the revolving fund certificates had no fair market value when
issued. What the appellate courts would have held if the question had been
presented squarely to them is a matter for conjecture. By finding that the
retain certificate had no fair market value, the Court of Appeals had
rejected the Treasury Department's ruling that the face amount was
reportable.7"
The most recent case on the tax question under discussion added chaos
to confusion! Moe v. Earle74 involved an Oregon farmer who had been a
member of the Apple Growers Association as far back as 1929. He had been
a party to the Association's standard marketing contract during the entire
span of his membership. The contract provided for payment of advances'
to growers and payment of net proceeds within 30 days of the closing of
the pool from which his produce was marketed. The by-laws of the Associa-
tion contained provisions for deductions from amounts paid growers to be
credited to a Building and Equipment Fund. Deductions were made in 1930,
1931, 1935, 1936 and 1937. Growers received Pool Closing Statements
which indicated amounts received by the co-op from the sale of produce, the
expenses and deductions and the net credit to be paid to them.
Until 1940 the cooperative's by-laws contained no requirement that
retain certificates be issued to evidence the Building and Equipment Fund
deductions. In that year, however, the Fund was made a part of a revolving
fund and provision made for the issuance of certificates. In 1942 the
Association completed the computation of the amounts due each grower
and issued certificates. These documents were entitled Certificates of Contri-
bution to Revolving Capital Fund. They included a statement to the effect
that they did not constitute debts of the Association, were null and void if
the membership of the recipient was cancelled and were not negotiable.
Their redemption was at the sole discretion of the Association's Board of
Directors, and they bore no interest. Each year after 1942 the Cooperative
issued a similar certificate to growers representing the prior year's deduction.
In 1949 the Association revolved out the amount of the 1930 and 1931
"contributions." Taxpayer, who had not filed returns during the 1930's
and had not included any part of the certificates in gross income for 1942
or subsequent years, reported the amounts revolved out to him in 1949
in his gross income. Additional sums were revolved out to Moe in 1951 and
these too were reported in his gross income for the year. The taxpayer there-
after filed a claim for refund of taxes, based on the argument that the
Letter from T. C. Mooney, supra note 45.
"5 CCH 1955 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 9 9180 (D. Ore. 1954).
amounts received in 1949 and 1951 were returns of capital and constituted
income only in the 1930's when they were contributed to the Association.
In the meantime the Bureau of Internal Revenue had conducted a field
audit of Moe's 1949 return and had added to his gross income the face value
of the 1949 Contribution Certificates and assessed a deficiency in that amount.
This audit was subsequent to the Treasury Department's announcement in
1950 that the face amount of retain certificates was includable in gross
income in the year received.75 The taxpayer's 1951 return included the
amount of that year's certificate. The claim for refunds for both years were
denied.
The taxpayer brought suit against the Collector of Internal Revenue at
Portland, Oregon. The basis of his suit was that the sums deducted in the
1930's by the cooperative had been constructively received and had been
contributed back to the Building and Equipment Fund. The complaint pointed
out that the standard growers contract called for payment of net proceeds
without deductions within 30 days of the closing of the pool to which their
crop was assigned.
In an unwritten opinion the trial court concluded that the cash received
by the taxpayers in 1949 and 1951 was income then and held that the
sums deducted in the 1930's were neither income then nor in 1942 when
certificates representing the retains were issued. Thus in reporting the cash
received in 1949 and 1951 taxpayer had been correct and was not entitled
to refunds. The court relied on Caswell v. Commissioner"m in support of its
ruling that the certificates issued in 1942 did not constitute income then
and that the deductions made in the 1930's did not constitute constructive
receipt of income.
On appeal the Government as appellee was on the horns of a dilemma.
It had to rely on the Caswell case to support the decision in its favor in the
District Court; but, the holding in the Caswell case was contrary to the
position of the Treasury Department on the general problem of taxation of
retain certificates; and the Moe case was being appealed to the same court
that had decided Caswell. A decision denying the refund would strengthen
the Caswell case, but if the court reversed itself and overruled Caswell,
the Government would lose the Moe case.
In this unenviable position the appellee's brief made no attempt to
distinguish the cases on the facts. It merely agreed with appellant that the
trial court's decision in Moe v. Earle and the Caswell case were both
contrary to ". . . long established practice of the Internal Revenue Serv-
" U. S. TREASURY DEPT., Income Tax Information Release No. 2, April 13, 1950.
70 211 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1954).
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ice .. ."" The invitation was certainly implied for the court to reverse
itself and overrule Caswell.
The court refused the invitation. In a per curiam decision they said:
"This appeal raises complicated questions in regard to the withholding
of a portion of the proceeds derived from handling and marketing of apples
by a cooperative organization. . . .The judgment is affirmed without a
reasoned opinion because we adhere to the general principles expressed in
the case of Caswell v. Commissioner, 211 F.2d 693."'78
That the court should stand on its prior decision is not surprising. That
the Revenue Service should allow itself to be placed in such a position is
surprising. The explanation may lie in Revenue Ruling 54-10,71 which was
issued after adoption of regulations regarding tax treatment of recipients of
retain certificates.8 " There the Service instructed its employees that if the
period of limitations had not expired, the face amount of the certificate
allocated to the cooperative patron should be included in his gross income
in the year of allocation. On the other hand if the statute had run the
Service is instructed to include the amount of cash received by the patron
in gross income of the year of redemption which was not reported in the
year of allocation. The taxpayer in Moe v. Earle received the certificate in
1942. The statute of limitations for a deficiency assessment against that
year's return had run8 ' and apparently the Treasury followed the alterna-
tive course of including the 1949 and 1951 redemptions in Moe's income
for that year.
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Moe v. Earle raises questions which
cannot be answered at the time of this writing. It is unlikely that the
Service will now acquiesce in Caswell. They will probably stand by their
regulations. In view of this probable stand, how shall farmers report their
retain certificates? If they report these documents in the year allocated, will
the Revenue Service use the Moe and Caswell cases to tax cash redemptions
after the period of limitations has run on refunds for the year of allocation?
The answers may differ from circuit to circuit since only the Fifth and Ninth
Circuits have been heard on the subject. However, with the Tax Court
decisions in Carpenter and Howey and the Southern District Court of Iowa's
opinion in the Farmers Grain Dealers case" allied against them, the
Treasury has a decreasing number of untried courts.
In oral arguments before the appellate court in Moe v. Earle, the gov-
ernment suggested that the court should adopt two rules. One would apply
" Brief for the Appellee, Moe v. Earle, No. 14623 (9th Cir. 1955).
'Moe v. Earle, No. 14623 (9th Cir. 1955). The court also cited Commissioner v. Carpenter,
219 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1955).
111954-1 CuM. BOLL. 24.
"U. S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.22 (a) -23 (1954).
"INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 275.,Farmers Grain Dealers Assn. of Iowa v. U. S., 116 F. Supp. 685 (S.D. Iowa 1953).
to retain certificates received prior to 1951; the other to those documents
received thereafter. The request for a different rule for 1951 and thereafter
was supported by quotations from the Senate hearings 3 which led to the
1951 amendments to section 101(12) of the Internal Revenue Code discussed
earlier.8 4 According to the government's oral arguments the Treasury Depart-
ment understood at these hearings that there was no opposition to their rule
of consistency which would tax retains to the patron if exempted from
the co-op's gross income.
The answers to the farmers' question of how to report retain certificates
may come from the legislative body." The simplest solution to the problem
would be for Congress to yield to pressure from other business groups and
restrict the cooperative's tax exemption. It would be easier to collect the tax
at the organization level; and the Ninth Circuit by citing Eisner v. Macomber 6
in support of its decision in Caswell cast advance constitutional doubts on any
law attempting to tax all retain certificates in the hands of patrons. On the
other hand federal income taxation of net earnings of a cooperative has
already passed one constitutional barrier.8 7
Another possible course of action is a withholding tax levied on each
patron's retains at the cooperative level.88 That plan would also be easy to
administer from the government's point of view. It would remove the
question of fair market value of certificates from most of the cases. A
withholding tax on retain certificates would place the burden on the farmer
to claim a bad debt or capital loss in later years.
It is possible however that nothing will be done about the problem in
the next session of Congress. In a period of falling farm prices Congress may
hesitate to enact such legislation, particularly since it is an election year.
In the meantime, the safest course of action appears to be to report
retain certificates when received and to keep an eye on the period of
limitation on refund claims. Congress may come to the rescue before the
statute runs on current years returns.
Senate Hearings on the Revenue Act of 1951, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 1251-1436 (1951).
This argument has been made by others outside the Treasury Department. See Address by Leonard
Silverstein of the Washington, D. C., bar, Agricultural Council of California Annual Meeting,
June 25, 1955.
s, INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 101 (12) (B).
s Letter from Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey to Representative Jere Cooper,
July 26, 1955. In that letter the Secretary states that Congress assumed in 1951 that the Treasury's
regulations would be upheld and intended that cooperative income should be taxed either to the
organization or to its members.
8- 252 U.S. 189 (1920). The case held that a stock dividend did not fall within the definition
of income in the Sixteenth Amendment.
"' In Farmers Union Co-op of Guide Rock v. Commissioner, 90 F.2d 488 (8th Cir. 1937), the
court held that net earnings of a cooperative constituted taxable corporate income under the
Sixteenth Amendment.
" Letter from Secretary of the Treasury, supra note 85.
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